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I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment1 ensures the freedom of speech which may not be 
abridged by the United States government.  However, there are particular 
instances in which it is necessary and proper for the legislature to enact laws 
restricting speech in order to protect other liberties.2  These permissible 
restrictions on speech vary based on several factors, including the forum in 
which the restriction is imposed.3  In the traditional public forum, the state 
typically may enforce a content-neutral restriction on speech, restricting the 
time, place, and manner of speech, so long as the regulations “are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.”4 
Traditionally, the rule regarding the traditional public forum was that a 
street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.5  While these places are still essential in the spatial 
context of where one might have access to exercise these rights, arguably a 
fairly limited amount of speech is exercised on streets or parks in our 
current culture.  Instead, perhaps the most significant forum for the 
exchange of information and individual opinions is the Internet, and more 
specifically, social media.6  This inexpensive and instantaneous method of 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 3. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 596, 672 (1987) (citing Perry Educ. 
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)). 
 4. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 5. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (discussing when the 
government may regulate speech in a traditional public forum). 
 6. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 868 (1997)). 
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communication allows for users to engage in a variety of activities, most of 
which are protected by the First Amendment, just as they would be 
protected in the traditional public forum.7  Applying the same standard used 
in the established traditional public forum for content-neutral speech, the 
Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina found North Carolina’s 
statute8 banning the use of commercial social networking sites by registered 
sex offenders unconstitutional.9 
Packingham is one of the initial Supreme Court cases to address the 
relationship between the First Amendment and the Internet.10   Using the 
already established standard of intermediate scrutiny to assess the 
constitutionality of this statute, the Court has made the first step in 
determining what parameters are to be set around Internet speech.10  
However, the concurrence cautions the Court that this may be too broad of a 
ruling, and with the Internet being a vast and expansive place, the 
implications of such a ruling may not yet be known.11 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2008 the North Carolina legislature enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
202.5, which made the use of “‘commercial social networking Web site 
where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to 
become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages’” a felonious 
offense.12  The expansive criteria include the site being operated by a person 
who derives revenue from the site, facilitating social introductions between 
two or more persons, allowing personal profiles to be created containing 
personal information that may be accessed by other users, and providing a 
mechanism for communication with other users.13  The statute allows for 
two exceptions: where the site’s primary purpose is to facilitate commercial 
transactions or the site involves only one discreet service, such as email or 
photo-sharing.14 
One affected registered sex offender was Lester Gerrard Packingham 
(hereinafter “Packingham”) from North Carolina.15  In 2002 Packingham 
pled guilty to “taking indecent liberties with a child,” an offense which 
required him to register as a sex offender in accordance with the state’s 
 
 7. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
 8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009). 
 9. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
 10. Id. at 1736. 
 11. Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 12. Id. at 1733. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. 
 15. Id. 
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registration statute.16  About eight years after Packingham’s plea and 
required registration, an officer within the Durham Police Department was 
tasked with investigating registered sex offenders who were believed to be 
violating the statute prohibiting membership and use of commercial social 
networking sites.17  Under a false alias, Packingham was a member of 
Facebook, a commonly used commercial social networking website within 
the meaning of the statute.18  It was under this alias account where 
Packingham posted a public message about a court appearance he had in 
which the judge dismissed his parking ticket.19  By matching up the false 
name and the time of the post with the true identity and the time of the 
dismissed parking ticket, the Durham Police Department was able to show 
enough cause to obtain a warrant and was able to connect the alias on 
Facebook to Packingham.20 
A grand jury indicted Packingham for his violation of the commercial 
social networking site statute and the trial court denied a motion to dismiss 
for violation of Packingham’s First Amendment rights.21  The court of 
appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, stating the statute was “not 
narrowly tailored to serve the State’s legitimate interest.”22  The North 
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision, ruling that 
the sex offender ban from the commercial social networking site statute was 
constitutional because it was carefully tailored and allowed for alternative 
means of communication on the Internet.23  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.24 
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE 
A.   The Majority Opinion – Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in which Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.25  Justice Alito wrote 
separately, concurring in judgment with which Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas joined.26  Newly appointed Justice Gorsuch took no part in 
 
 16. N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.6(a), 14-208.7 (referring to lifetime and general registration 
requirements for criminal offenders residing in North Carolina). 
 17. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (quoting State v. Packingham, 229 N.C. App. 293, 304 
(2013)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1733. 
 26. Id. 
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the consideration of the case.27  The majority utilized the intermediate 
scrutiny standard of review on the basis that the statute in question 
constituted a content-neutral limitation on speech.28  This standard calls for 
a statute to be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest” 
and it may not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to 
prevent whatever act the state is trying to prevent.29  Applying this 
intermediate scrutiny test, the Court held that the statute was 
unconstitutional as the state was unable to show a legitimate government 
interest, failed to carry its burden of proof that the statute was narrowly 
tailored to directly advance its interest, and that the regulation was the least 
restrictive means to accomplish the state’s interest.30 
The state argued that the broad restrictions in the statute were required 
to achieve its preventative purpose, namely, that it must prevent the sexual 
predation of children.31   Even under intermediate scrutiny, the regulation of 
the time, place, and manner in which the speech occurred was not overly 
broad.32  The state cited Burson v. Freeman in which this Court upheld a 
prohibition on political campaigns continuing to campaign within 100 feet 
of a polling place.33  Finding that Burson did not support the present case, 
Justice Kennedy distinguished the two, noting that Burson involved a 
limited speech restriction, the burden of which was outweighed by the need 
to protect another fundamental right, rather than a restriction that is 
burdensome for a particular state interest.34  Burson was a constitutional 
compromise, balancing the right to vote with the right to freedom of 
speech.35  This analogy failed against Packingham, as there was not another 
constitutional right being balanced here.36 
Justice Kennedy then postulated that a better analogy for the present 
case would derive from the reasoning in Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los 
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.37  In Jews for Jesus, the Court found that the 
total ban of “First Amendment activities” at the Los Angeles International 
Airport was not constitutional because the ordinance covered all protected 
and non-disruptive speech.38  Being a single private location and not 
allowing for such a broad ban on speech, it naturally follows that in the  
 27. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733. 
 28. Id. at 1736. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1737. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 33. Id. at 1738 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)). 
 34. Id. at 1738. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (citing Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 569). 
 38. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574. 
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present case, where the state attempted to ban speech from virtual locations, 
which exist nowhere and everywhere at once, the ban is far too broad.39 
Additionally, the majority equated the Internet with that of traditional 
and quintessential public forums, such as public streets and parks.40  The 
Internet, and social media more specifically, is the fastest and most 
prevalent way for people to find jobs, debate current matters of the day, and 
engage directly and instantaneously with elected officials.41  Due to the 
nature of the Internet, it provides people with a way to make their voices 
heard more than ever before.42  This ability to access “vast realms of human 
thought and knowledge” is important for all Americans, but can be 
especially important for those who are convicted criminals, as a way for 
them to reintegrate into the society in which we live and gives them the 
ability to connect to a world of ideas.43  A total ban from this vast network 
of thought and communication is unprecedented, yet gives an outer 
boundary for what Internet speech may be regulated by a state.44 
Though not presently before the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that a 
state may enact more specific laws than this one in order to prevent the 
sexual abuse and exploitation of minors.45  The Court cited Brandenburg v. 
Ohio stating that, “[s]pecific criminal acts are not protected speech even if 
speech is the means for their commission.”46  This must be balanced, 
however, with the notion that “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful 
speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.”47  Essentially, the Court 
stated that a state may have a legitimate interest in suppressing speech that 
may result in the sexual predation of children, and that such speech may be 
trammeled, yet the state’s regulations must be narrowly tailored to restrict 
specific speech acts, and not entirely close a vast arena for speech 
completely.48 
B. The Concurring in Judgment – Justice Alito 
The concurrence delivered by Justice Alito, in which Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas joined, supported the majority in the judgment,  
 39. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
 40. Id. at 1735. 
 41. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (citing Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner) (using governors of all 50 states and members of Congress as 
examples of the extent the Internet has one the ability to communicate with elected officials). 
 42. Id. at 1737 (“They allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a 
voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’” (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). 
 47. Id. at 1738 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 239, 255 (2002)). 
 48. Id. at 1737. 
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but warned against interpreting the “undisciplined dicta” too broadly.49  
Justice Alito primarily expressed concern with the “loose rhetoric” of the 
majority.50  In equating the whole of the Internet with that of the traditional 
public forum, the majority failed to address the specificity that is involved 
within the Internet.51  Justice Alito noted key differences between the virtual 
world and the physical world, namely the visibility of the latter.52  In the 
physical world, it is much easier to prevent criminals from attempting their 
crimes due to the visibility in its occurrence.53  The Internet however, 
provides a veil under which a sexual predator may cloak himself or herself 
in virtual anonymity that may not be a possibility in reality.54  Because the 
majority fails to make this distinction, the concurrence warned that there 
should be more specificity in the sites that are off limits to registered sex 
offenders.55 
Justice Alito would have the Court define more specific parameters for 
websites that are unlawful for sex offenders to access.56  The current statute 
would broadly include such a range of benign websites that are “unlikely to 
facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a child,” namely sites such 
as Amazon.com, WebMD, and the Washington Post online.57  The 
concurrence listed those sites as ones that fit within the definition of a 
commercial social networking website under the North Carolina statute, yet 
due to the purpose and usage of these sites, they are “ill suited for use in 
stalking or abusing children.”58 
The danger that must be identified here is that the Internet, if it is to be 
equated with the traditional public forum, should not be viewed 
simplistically as one large space within which a state cannot restrict speech; 
rather, the Internet must be further subdivided.59  According to Justice Alito, 
there is a difference between sites such as Amazon.com and social media 
sites that are geared toward a minor audience.60  The majority fails to 
distinguish between the variety of sites, giving an overarching statement 
that a state may enact more specific laws regarding the restriction of sex 
offenders access to social media without further defining the types of sites 
 
 49. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 1743. 
 51. Id. at 1738. 
 52. Id. at 1743. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1743 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1741-42. 
 58. Id. at 1743. 
 59. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 1743. 
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that could be restricted.61  The overall argument made by the concurrence 
was that while First Amendment protections on the Internet are necessary, 
there should be caution in applying the Court’s free speech precedents to the 
Internet as a whole.62  Because the full dimensions of the Internet are 
unknown at the present time, Justice Alito warned the Court that too broad 
of a protection within cyberspace may not reflect the circumstances for 
which protections are meant to be afforded.63 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
The Supreme Court has generally been hesitant to address the 
relationship between the Internet and the First Amendment.64  Very few 
cases decided by the Supreme Court have analyzed the issue of what 
Internet speech may be regulated and when such regulation may occur.  As 
the Internet is a vast and virtual space, it is difficult to stricture boundaries 
by which speech can or should be limited.  As the Internet has evolved over 
the past few decades, the commercial nature of the Internet has created a 
virtual marketplace and social forum.65  This evolution changes the ways in 
which people interact with and on the Internet.  The Court realized that the 
“Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions” and due to this 
realization, are unwilling to make a determination that may soon be 
obsolete.66 
In spite of this stance typical of the Supreme Court, the decision in 
Packingham does address current concerns in the relationship between the 
Internet and the First Amendment, setting a standard by which the 
government may regulate content-neutral Internet speech.67  The decision in 
Packingham required the Court take a stance on Internet speech, the 
repercussions of which are many.  The globalization of the Internet and the 
new parameters by which the government may regulate American’s online 
speech is unprecedented.  This note will discuss the Court’s previous stance 
on regulating Internet speech, where Packingham might lead the Court and 
other governmental bodies going forward, and a state’s interest in protecting 
minor children by offering solutions that do not trammel protected speech. 
 
 61. Id. at 1738. 
 62. Id. at 1744. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 65. Boundless, Global Marketing and the Internet, BOUNDLESS MKTING (Aug. 30, 2017, 10:41 
AM), https://www.boundless.com/marketing/textbooks/boundless-marketing-textbook/global-marketing-
7/global-marketing-mix-56/global-marketing-and-the-internet-286-6895/. 
 66. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 67. Id. 
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B. Expansion Of Prior Law 
The Court has been cautious in its review and application of First 
Amendment restrictions in relation to the Internet, Packingham being one of 
the first in this arena to be granted certiorari.68  Packingham effectively 
expanded the Court’s current stance on Internet speech restrictions, having 
previously ruled on content-based Internet speech restrictions.69  The Court 
generally ruled on cases involving legislation protecting minors from being 
exposed to indecent material on the Internet such as the Communications 
Decency Act, Child Pornography Prevention Act, and the Child Online 
Protection Act.70  All of these laws are related to children and pornographic 
material on the Internet.71  While those laws were enacted in order to protect 
children, the laws were subjected to strict scrutiny, the highest standard of 
review, because they contained content-based restrictions.72  While in the 
same vein as the speech discussed in Packingham, strict scrutiny review is 
just that, strict, making it difficult for government actors to achieve their 
goal of restricting Internet speech.73 
Most restrictions on speech on the Internet do not emanate from the 
government, but from private corporations that own and regulate users of 
their social media sites.74  These privatized restrictions on Internet speech 
are favored due to a “presumption in favor of the enforceability of a 
contract.”75  By contracting over terms of use, rather than terms being 
delineated by a governmental entity, the commercial and marketplace nature 
of the Internet thrives within its own structure.76  Many social media sites 
require the user to agree to terms of service in order to fully access the 
benefits of the site.  These social media sites have built into their user 
agreements specific rules regarding speech acts their users are allowed to 
engage in, as well as provided a mechanism for the site to remove an 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234 (holding that provisions in the Child Pornography 
Protection act were too broad under a strict scrutiny standard, and therefore unconstitutional); see also 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 239 (holding that breadth of the provisions in the Communications Decency Act 
“lack[] the precision that the First Amendment requires” and ultimately the State did not meet its burden 
for regulating content-based speech). 
 70. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 239; see Reno, 521 U.S. at 858-59. 
 71. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230 (1998); Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 
U.S.C. 2251 (1996); Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 231 (1998). 
 72. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230 (1998); Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 
U.S.C. 2251 (1996); Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 231 (1998). 
 73. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879. 
 74. Alice E. Marwick, Are There Limits To Online Free Speech?, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Jan. 
5, 2017), https://points.datasociety.net/are-there-limits-to-online-free-speech-14dbb7069aec. 
 75. Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment Scrutiny of 
Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 949 (2014). 
 76. Id. 
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uncooperative person’s access to an account.  For example, the social media 
site Facebook prohibits users from engaging in “hate speech” and removes 
accounts containing this prohibited content.77  The social media site Twitter 
recently suspended accounts linked to a neo-Nazi website.78  The 
privatization of Internet speech regulation is essential in a free market as it 
allows companies to dictate their own business practices.  The decision in 
Packingham adopts a new avenue for government regulation, allowing the 
government to interfere with individual social media entities and their 
ability to regulate speech that occurs on their websites. 
The Court has also cautiously side-stepped recent cases involving 
student Internet speech, denying certiorari in many recent cases.79  In 
several instances, schools have enacted regulations that limit off-campus 
Internet speech by students.80  Many lower courts have relied on and 
expanded the  Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist.81  In Tinker, the Court held that students’ on-campus speech could 
be regulated under specific circumstances, namely the substantial disruption 
standard which stated a school may regulate a student’s on-campus speech 
if it can be reasonably forecasted that a substantial disruption or material 
interference would occur in the school, and some disruption did in fact 
occur.82  This substantial disruption must interfere with the operation of the 
school, and not be a mere desire to avoid discomfort and unpleasantness in 
the school environment.83  Several lower courts have tried to expand this 
substantial disruption test to off-campus discourse based on the proposition 
that speech that originates off-campus nevertheless simultaneously exists 
on-campus because of the invasive virtual nature of the Internet.84  This 
paradoxical viewpoint could lead to increasingly absurd results, such as 
campuses attempting to regulate the off-campus Internet speech of non-
students on the theory that all Internet communications are reasonably 
forecasted to breach the borders of the campus causing disruption; a result 
the Court has aimed to avoid through its lack of review of off-campus 
speech cases. 
 
 77. David Ingram, Twitter Shutters Accounts of U.S. White Supremacy Website, REUTERS (Aug. 
16, 2017, 9:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/virginia-protests-tech-idUSL2N1L21N5. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See generally Bell v. Itowamba, 799 F.3d 379 (2015), petition for cert. filed, (15-666), 2016 
LEXIS 475. 
 80. Dunkley v. Bd. Of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492 (2016) (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. 
Sch., 652 F.3d 565, at 568-69 (4th Cir. 2011)) (referring to school-implemented policy for harassment, 
which reaches students’ off-campus speech). 
 81. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
 82. Id. at 512-13. 
 83. Id. at 509. 
 84. See generally C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering 
whether a school can regulate students’ off-campus speech). 
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The cases and ideals of the Court pre-Packingham show a Court 
resistant to deciding the extent to which a state has the ability to regulate 
Internet speech.  Packingham has carved out a new direction for the Court, 
sending forth a definitive standard by which governmental bodies may now 
tailor their laws in order to gain more control and power over speech 
disseminated over the Internet.85 
C. Forecasted Effect On Future Decisions 
In this relatively new realm of cyberspace, and the new potential 
government influence and dominion in limiting speech within it, creates 
difficulty in pinning down and defining the depth with which the 
government may regulate the online speech of an individual.  The test 
placed before us by the Packingham Court gives the outer perimeter, but 
how far wide the reach is to that perimeter is not yet known.  The virtual, 
nontangible nature of the Internet adds to the difficulty of determining just 
where a governmental body may reach out and attempt to take hold.86  
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a government agent need only put into 
effect a law that is both narrowly tailored to and includes a substantial 
government interest.87  The low threshold of this standard paired with a 
multitude of state actors who may implement new laws under the guise of 
substantial government interest or of being narrowly tailored may be 
detrimental to individuals’ speech protections.  Individuals should be on 
notice that these laws might come into being and courts must prepare for an 
influx of claims against laws restricting Internet speech.  The Internet is a 
different world than our physical world.88  The vastness yet closeness of it 
in our daily lives creates a difficult task for government actors desiring to 
help protect the rights of some individuals, while ousting others. 
Under the privatized “terms of use” contract system, access to the 
Internet as a public forum exists in a “take it or leave it” situation.  Just as a 
person need not enter a business she does not like nor enter a park where 
she witnesses people demonstrating their First Amendment rights, the same 
is true  with the Internet.  If she does not like the “terms of use” for a 
particular site, she may find another one or even create her own website, 
giving her a place within the expanse of the Internet to exercise her right to 
protected speech. 
 
 85. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 86. Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 87. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 88. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring). 
10
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The troubling issue that arises out of the holding in Packingham occurs 
when a state meets the intermediate scrutiny standard.89  When this occurs, 
there is no longer a “take it or leave it” option to access the particular forum 
on an individual’s own volition.  Under this standard, access is barred from 
this forum.  The Court in Packingham failed to give further examples of 
classification for what status an individual might need in order to be 
prevented from  access to certain Internet sites.  The only status addressed 
in Packingham was a criminal status.90 
The Court briefly mentioned in dicta an issue with the state’s attempt to 
enforce severe restrictions on Internet speech for persons who have already 
served their sentences for their crimes.91  While not binding authority, it is 
important to note the Court’s dislike and caution in identifying a status of 
people in which the state may restrict access to an Internet forum.  The state 
seemed to equate the status of registered sex offender to someone who is 
still under the supervision of a court through this additional restriction on 
speech.92  Persons who are currently incarcerated are not afforded the same 
protections as those who are outside a court’s supervision.93  However, once 
a person has completed her sentence, she is not under the control of a court 
and has expanded access to her fundamental rights, including the freedom 
of speech.  While Second Amendment rights are quelled post-incarceration 
by felonious status, the First and Fourth Amendments do not loosen their 
grasp due to felonious status.94  This Court has not held that a person’s First 
Amendment right is trammeled by this status, and in fact encourages the use 
of the Internet as a way of integrating back into society and finding a job.95 
The idea of not restricting a person’s rights post-incarceration is 
welcome amidst the vast possibilities of speech restrictions available after 
this case.  Looking forward in light of the Packingham decision, there are 
other ways a state may serve its legitimate interest in protecting children 
without quelling a registered sex offender’s (or any other status offender’s) 
right to free speech. 
 
 89. Packingham, 173 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 90. Id. at 1737. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[W]e have held that even when an institutional 
restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must 
be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional 
security.”). 
 94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008). 
 95. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
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D. Alternatives To Restricting Registered Sex Offenders’ Internet 
Speech 
The Court in Packingham recognized that the state had a legitimate 
interest in protecting minor children from potential sexual predators on the 
Internet.96  However, as an alternative to the denial of full access to 
commercial social media sites,97 states enacting laws with the goal to protect 
minor children from sex offenders could amend their registration statutes to 
include a requirement for those who must register to provide a list of any 
social media site they are a member of, as well as requiring their full legal 
name to be used on the site.98  The legal name requirement allows members 
of the forum, in which the registered sex offender is also a member, the 
ability to look up that person’s already published registration status.  As 
registered sex offenders are already required to publish publicly their status 
as such,99 the additional name requirement online does not infringe on their 
ability to access and engage in the forum in which speech is freely 
exchanged.100  Rather, it fosters a state’s interest in protecting minor 
children from predation, as the name of whomever may come into contact 
with them is easily searchable in order to discover any suspicious or mal 
intent. 
In light of the Packingham decision, a state may decide to restrict 
Internet speech in order to achieve its interest.  However, the decision by 
this Court to allow Internet speech regulation by the government as long as 
it meets the test of intermediate scrutiny is not the only way a state may 
further its legitimate interest.  The Court does not foreclose on a state’s 
ability to add or alter its current statutes to include more elements.  This 
alternative would allow  a state to both protect children and protect the 
speech rights typically afforded to individuals in a public forum. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The future of the government’s restriction on Internet speech is as 
expansive as the Internet itself.  The need to balance multiple constitutional 
protections between individuals and those who a state has a substantial 
interest in specially protecting is not an easy task.  To prevent a person or 
status of people from accessing what has quickly become the most 
 
 96. Id. at 1739 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982)). 
 97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (defining commercial social media sites). 
 98. See generally Commonwealth v. Peebles, No. 72 MDA 2017, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 
2927 (Aug. 4, 2017). 
 99. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.7 (detailing general registration requirements for criminal sex 
offenders residing in North Carolina). 
 100. See Peebles, 2017 LEXIS 2927, at n.2 (citing Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733). 
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significant forum for exchange of thought101 is averse to the fundamental 
American belief that government should not abridge the right to freedom of 
speech.102  However, the result in Packingham has opened the door to a 
state’s ability to determine what interest is substantial enough for them to 






 101. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (citing Reno, 521 U.S., at 868). 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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